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Abstract
To achieve the goal of building an autonomous agent, the usually disjoint capabilities of planning,
execution, and learning must be used together. This paper describes an architecture, called MAX, within
which cognitive capabilities can be purposefully and intelligently integrated. The architecture supports the
codification of capabilities as explicit knowledge that can be reasoned about. In addition, specific problem
solving, learning, and integration knowledge is developed.
I. Introduction
The expense, isolation, danger, and uncertainty involved in space research vividly points out the need for
robust autonomous robots. However, the current generation of intelligent systems only present a subset of
the requisite behavior. For an intelligent system to be a competent autonomous agent, many different
cognitive capabilities must be solidly integrated. For example, an autonomous system is more than a
planner that generates an answer given a precise problem specification; it must actually take actions
dictated by its reasoning. However, it is not sufficient merely to give a plan to a simple execution system;
the unpredictability of the world makes it very unlikely that the plan is correct or complete. A system must
be able to suspend planning or execution in order to seek needed information. However, the acquisition of
knowledge, itself, may require planning and execution. Thus, there is a complete interdependence between
the various cognitive capabilities.
These issues stem from the relaxation of two assumptions commonly made in problem solving: the
availability of complete knowledge, and a static environment. Complete knowledge is fundamental to the
plan-then-execute paradigm assumed by many problem solvers. However, it is an assumption that is
simply invalid in many cases. The ability to take action based on incomplete information, and to
intentionally acquire new knowledge, is fundamental if a system is to operate robustly in real environments.
Another complication is that real-world environments tend to be dynamic. A successful agent must always
be aware of the external world, and it must be able to suspend any task in favor of a more urgent task. The
problem of integrating planning and execution in a dynamic world is even more complex if consideration is
given to the fact that reasoning, itself, is not a "free" activity. Reasoning requires time, and it is not always
safe to assume that a system has as much time to think as required. A successful autonomous agent must
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be able to rationally control its reasoning, just as it must rationally control its physical capabilities.
This paper describes work in progress aimed at integrating previously separate capabilities into a unified
autonomous system that can function in an unknown and dynamic environment. The focus is the
synergistic interaction of the components, rather than better individual components. There are two main
components of the research. First is the development of an architecture, called MAX, that permits the
principled, knowledge-based integration of complex capabilities via meta-level reasoning. This is
discussed in section 3. Second is the codification of knowledge that intelligently interleaves each
capability. This is presented in section 4. Section 5 describes an extended example in which all parts of
the system work together. However, before delving into MAX, a brief survey of other work is presented.
2. Related Work
Prior research has tended to focus on various subproblems of building autonomous agents, such as
planning, learning, and vision, under the principle of divide and conquer. There has been little work on
systems that integrate such behavior. However, there has recently been an increase of interest in the
high-level control of autonomous agents, as well as cognitive architectures that cover, in principle, a broad
range of capabilities. These systems can be roughly organized according to their reliance on explicit
reasoning.
At one end of the spectrum are those systems, such as Pengi [1], that propose situated activity as the
mechanism behind higher level planning. The research of Brooks [3] emphasizes the use of a hierarchy of
behavioral components, each of which uses perceptual information directly to produce some behavior.
Kaelbling [8] also tends toward such an architecture, but she also suggests the need for explicit planning.
Another step toward explicit reasoning is represented by the Procedural Reasoning System system of
Georgeff et al [6] which does pattern-directed invocation of canned procedures. These systems posit, to
varying degrees, that high level planning is not required, as it can emerge from lower-level behavior. This
thesis has not yet been adequately proven.
Moving away from robot control architectures, a number of systems propose a relatively weak
integration of intelligent modules. This model is exemplified by plan-then-execute systems such as
NOAH [13] and SIPE [16]. Another form of loose integration is the black-board architecture, used by
systems such as BB1 [7] and Codger [15]. In general, the top-level control structures used by these loosely
integrated systems only address a subset of the integrated behavior required of autonomous agents.
Strongly integrated systems are represented by the set of general architectures intended to be applicable
to any task. Cognitive architectures such as ACT* [2] and SOAR [9] have achieved a fair degree of
success in this regard. However, they have not been applied to the task of rationally integrating various
intelligent capabilities in a dynamic environment. Furthermore, the assumptions imposed by the added
constraint of cognitive plausibility may make such integration difficult. Another candidate architecture is
PRODIGY [11], which provides a variety of base-level reasoning and learning mechanisms. In fact, the
work described in this paper is an effort to evolve PRODIGY into a competent meta-level reasoner.
Further along the spectrum are systems designed explicitly for meta-level reasoning. Examples include
MOLGEN [14], MRS [5], and Theo [12]. These systems are capable of very elaborate reasoning, but their
application to a real-time, irreversible environment is problematical.
Since there hasn't been much work on meta-level architectures intended for autonomous agent control,
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there is very little in the way of meta-level knowledge required by such a system. Only pieces have been
investigated. The work on execution monitoring includes some techniques for coping with unexpected
situations, but only in restricted environments. Carbonell and Gil [4] have developed techniques to guide
experimentation to learn operators, and Eurisko [10] also performs some experimentation. However, the
higher level issues of intelligently integrating experimentation into an autonomous agent remain
unanswered.
3. The MAX Architecture
The main goal of the MAX architecture is to allow cognitive capabilities (e.g., planning and
experimentation) to be flexibly controlled. A powerful way to accomplish this is to enable the system to
reason about mental actions (perform meta-level reasoning) as well as reason about physical actions
(perform base-level reasoning). This, in turn, requires that system's cognitive capabilities be encoded as
explicit knowledge. It is this approach that underlies the design of MAX.
To elaborate, consider a traditional system in which the capabilities are hardwired into the kernel; the
capabilities can be applied only according to the foresight of the designer and the flexibility of the
algorithm. Undoubtedly, unforeseen situations will crop up with which the system cannot cope. Now
consider a system in which its capabilities are explicit knowledge. Such a system can use its entire
reasoning power to flexibly apply its capabilities. The system is no longer restricted to some hardwired
interaction between planning, execution, and learning. Furthermore, since the capabilities are encoded just
like any base-level knowledge, their implementation can use arbitrary amounts of knowledge to obtain
expert performance, and the capabilities can be modified by the system.
Encoding cognitive capabilities as knowledge requires that the knowledge representation be sufficiently
powerful, and that the system have the ability to execute explicit knowledge. It is these two requirements
that the MAX architecture is designed to meet. Section 3.1 describes MAX's knowledge representation,
which is powerful enough to implement cognitive capabilities while remaining simple enough to reason
about. Next, section 3.2 describes the control structure, which allows explicit knowledge to be executed.
3.1. Knowledge Representation
The foundation of MAX's knowledge representation is first order predicate logic augmented with a
single data structure, called an lframe (for logic-frame). An lframe can best be described as an
independent, explicit logical database, or state. Therefore, in contrast to traditional logic, where terms are
atomic symbols only, terms in MAX can also be structures representing entire states. Since a state is a
collection of logical assertions, an lframe is a recursive data structure, not unlike frames. However, there
are two features of lframes that produce the real leverage of the representation: the capability to represent
with one lframe an entire sets of states, and the presence of a set of high-level relations over lframes.
Consider figure 3-1 which shows a single lframe representing the definition of a Strips-style operator.
Brackets denote lframes, and parentheses denote logical assertions, or literals. Within the operator, there
are a number of assertions that specify its components: namely the input parameters, preconditions, adds,
and deletes. Furthermore, each component is, itself, an lframe that represents a state (or complement of a
state) of the blocks world. Note the Svars assertion, which declares a set of variables within the operator.
The variables allow the Iframe to represent an infinite number of operators, corresponding to the various
instantiations of the variables. Also notice that the variables declared within the operator as a whole are
referenced within the subcomponents of the operator. This constrains the values of subcomponents of the
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operator that can co-occur, insuring the operator remains valid (i.e., if the precondition matches a particular
object, the operator should not delete a different object from the state). The use of lexical variables is an
important feature of lframes, allowing the succinct representation of an entire set of states.
[ ($vars ?blockl ?block2)
(parameters [ (topblock ?blockl) (bottomblock ?block2) ] )
(precondition [ (holding ?block1)
(clear ?block2) ] )
(delete [ (holding ?blockl)
(clear ?block2) ] )
(add [ (on ?blockl ?block2) ] ) ]
Figure 3-1: Definition of the put operator
The other main feature of lframes is the definition of a set of high-level relations, most notably match,
intersection, union, and difference. These relations are basic to the reasoning process, just as
on is basic to the blocks world. These basic operations allow reasoning to be represented naturally as
explicit knowledge. Consider figure 3-2, which gives the definition of operator apply. This operator
states the effects of applying a subject operator, for example, put. The preconditions decompose the
subject operator into its components, verify that the preconditions match the current state, and specify the
relationship between the old state, deletes, adds, and new state. The delete and add of apply then specify
the changes to the state of the planner. The structure of the operator is identical to the base-level operator,
only the relations have changed.
[($vars ?op ?del ?add ?statel ?stateO ?state2 ?oldplan ?newplan)
(parameters [ (operator ?op) l )
(precondition [ (state ?statel)
(match ?op [($vars ?pre)
(precondition ?pre)
(match ?state1 ?pre)
(delete ?del)
(add ?add) ])
(difference ?statel ?del ?stateO)
(union ?stateO ?add ?state2)
(plan ?oldplan)
(postpend ?oldplan ?op ?newplan)] )
(delete [ (state ?state1)
(plan ?oldplan) l )
(add [ (state ?state2)
(plan ?newplan) ] ) ]
Figure 3-2: Definition of the apply operator
In summary, lframes are vital to the MAX architecture for several reasons. Lframes are an appropriate
data structure for representing the basic fodder of reasoning, namely states of knowledge. The capability to
introduce variables within lframes allows complex sets of states to be succinctly represented. Such a
capability is not present in either traditional logic or frame-based representations. The definition of basic
relations over lframes allows the consequences of knowledge to be represented without resorting to
representational details (i.e., traditional logic could be used to represent the apply operator, but the result
would be the implementation of a theorem prover in logic.) These features make it practical to represent
complex reasoning, a necessity in the rational integration of high-level capabilities.
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3.2. Control Structure
In addition to the knowledge representation, the other main component of the MAX architecture is the
control structure. The main goal is to allow the control of the agent to be based on explicit knowledge.
This supports a very flexible flow of control, avoiding the problem of control being hardwired into the
kernel. Indeed, there must still be some kernel that interprets the knowledge, but once the powerful
capabilities are removed, the kernel can be very simple. In other words, the kernel of MAX is just
powerful enough to execute knowledge rather than reason about knowledge.
The basic unit of the control structure is called a task, which is an lframe structure. A task can be
thought of as an explicit representation of a production system with two exceptions. First, the
"productions" are divided into operators and control rules representing what can be done and when to do it,
respectively. This allows a variety of control to be applied to a fixed set of actions (i.e., even though
actions are determined by the physical capabilities of the agent, when to do them is flexible). Second, an
operator (called a complex operator) can invoke a subtask that does an arbitrary amount of processing,
similar to operator implementation problem spaces in SOAR. This allows an agent to reason about abstract
actions, such as building a bridge or creating a plan that achieves a goal.
Consider the example of figure 3-3, which shows a planning task. The operators and control rules
correspond to traditional productions. The state corresponds to working memory. In this example, the
planning state consists of a blocks world goal, a current blocks world state, the plan being formed, and a
domain theory specifying the legal operators for the blocks world. This illustrates how the same language
can be used both to implement reasoning, and to represent knowledge (the object of reasoning). Finally,
the pending assertion indicates that this task was invoked by executing a complex operator within a
higher-level task, called solve. When the planning task is finished, the results are added to the solve task,
which is then resumed.
[ (rule apply-satisfied-operator [ (condition [... ] )
(action subgoal [...])])
(rule subgoal-on-goal-state-diff [... ] )
° ° °
(operator apply [ (precondition [... l )
(delete [...])
(add [...])l)
(operator subgoal [... ])
° ° °
(state
(pending solve
[(goal [(on block1 block2)])
(state [(on-table block1)
(on-table block2)])
(plan [(elt 1 pick [...]) (elt 2 put [...])])
(domain [(operator put [...])
(operator pick [...])])])
[(rule plan-when-difficult-goal [...])
. . °
(operator plan [...])
• . .
(state [...])])]
Figure3-3: Taskimplementing a _anner
The choice to build the MAX control structure on a production system was inspired by the successes
encountered in the world of expert systems. Also, productions are a natural means of implementing a
highly reactive system, a requirement for any autonomous agent. However, MAX is unique in that it
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unifiesproduction and working memory, in addition to process memory (tasks actually represent the
execution state). This gives MAX extreme flexibility to reason about and modify its own behavior, which
means nearly all control decisions can be considered explicitly. Finally, the separation of various
capabilities into different tasks results in a modular system, a large advantage from the practical standpoint
of system development.
4. Domain Knowledge
The MAX architecture provides a framework in which capabilities can be encoded and controlled. This
section outlines the kind of capabilities that can be encoded. Each capability of the agent, from the most
primitive (such as simple motion) to the very complex (such as planning), is encoded as a domain. A
domain is defined as a set of operators and a set of control rules. Therefore, a task is a snapshot of the
execution of a domain. Furthermore, since complex operators result in the execution of a subtask, there is a
domain associated with each complex operator. Conversely, a complex operator represents the external
specification of a domain.
Table 4-1 gives an overview of the key domains required to implement and integrate intelligent
capabilities. Each row specifies the name of the domain (which corresponds to the complex operator that is
used to invoke it), the key operators, selected control rules, and the main objects about which the domain
reasons. Notice that many domains use complex operators corresponding to other domains; thus, the
capabilities of the system are applied recursively.
The function of the select domain is to choose between various potential goals or activities. The select
domain consists of two operators, solve a goal (described below) and run a heuristic procedure (which
simply executes a specified domain). In addition, there are rules that specify when a particular operator
should be applied. In general, goals concerning robot safety should be considered first, followed by
primary goals, followed by background goals. Also, procedures should be used when available. However,
there are likely to be interactions requiring specific exceptions. This illustrates the heuristic nature of the
knowledge required in such domains; quite often there is no simple algorithm that provides the requisite
behavior.
The solve domain provides a rather unique but powerful capability, namely that of intelligently selecting
the problem solving approach used for a given goal. For example, the solve domain can choose between
forming and executing a plan, specializing and executing a canned plan, and executing a heuristic
procedure. The choice of problem solving tactic can be based on the presence of the requisite knowledge
plus heuristics about the particular domain and problem. Finally, the solve domain includes the option of
intentionally learning more about the environment or a domain theory. The importance of this is discussed
below.
Within the plan domain, there are two main operators corresponding to the two main actions of means-
ends analysis: subgoaling on an operator and applying an operator. Each of these operators affects the state
of the planner by modifying the hypothetical state, the goal, or the partial plan. Notice that the apply
operator is exactly that presented in figure 3-2. Unlike many problem solvers, a particular planning
algorithm is not built in to the system. Alternate domains could be added that implement forward chaining
or various forms of non-linear planning. Knowledge within a higher level domain would then be required
to select the most appropriate technique.
The execute domain is, on the surface, rather simple. It simply takes a plan and attempts to execute it.
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DOMAIN
select
solve
OPERATORS RULES STATE
run run-emergency-procedure current-state
solve solve-given-goal potential-goals
plan plan-when-difficult-goal goal
execute execute-when-plan-exists current-state
run run-heuristic-procedure base-domains
explore explore-when-info-needed
experiment experiment-when-faulty-ops
plan apply apply-satisfied-operator goal
subgoal subgoal-on-goal-state-diff current-state
exit-when-unsatisfied-axiom base-domain
plan-so-far
execute step-plan step-plan-when-as-expected plan
solve subgoal-when-discrepancy expected-state
exit-when-large-discrepancy perceived-state
explore search-loc search-inferred-location needed-info
current-model
locs-searched
experiment apply-op
modify-op
apply-op-in-different-state
modify-op-when-model-correct
expected-state
perceived-state
domain-theory
robot move pick-up-before-moving robot-loc
put object-loc
pick
Table 4-1: An overview of cognitive domains
However, this entails more than blindly stepping through the plan; the expectations at each step must be
examined and compared to the actual situation. If a significant discrepancy appears, the execute task must
decide how to correct the problem. For instance, if the discrepancy is slight, it is probably best to patch the
plan and continue. However, if the problem is significant, it is best to exit the execute task and allow the
higher level problem solving task to address the problem. This is an important option because the partial
execution of the plan may have resulted in the acquisition of knowledge that modifies the assumptions
underlying the plan. The rules governing the decision to patch or abort a plan are another example of the
heuristic knowledge required within many capabilities.
Even though a variety of failures can occur within the execute and plan domains, the basic cause is
almost always incomplete or incorrect knowledge. For example, the execution of a plan can fail if the
results of the operators are not as expected, and the planning domain can fail if key pieces of knowledge
about the state are missing. A robust autonomous agent must be able to cope with such situations,
motivating the need for an intentional knowledge acquisition capability. Two of the domains in table 4-1
supply such a capability. First, the experimentation domain implements the technique of Carbonell and
Gil [4] in which the preconditions and effects of operators are learned by performing experiments. Second,
the exploration domain allows the use of a partial knowledge structure in the process of augmenting that
knowledge structure. For example, knowledge of a door to another room suggests that an agent should
move through the door to discover the contents.
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The ability to perform intentional leaming requires more than the presence of learning techniques; the
invocation of learning activities must be intelligently controlled. For example, an agent with an urgent task
to accomplish should attempt all known approaches before embarking on a regime of experimentation to
learn the best approach. Thus, the solve domain contains heuristics that control the application of the
explore and experiment operators based on the current problem solving priorities. It is this level of control
that is vital to the rational integration of learning and problem solving.
Finally, in addition to implementing the cognitive capabilities of the agent, domains are also used in their
traditional role of representing the base-level capabilities of the agent. There is only one base-level domain
listed in table 4-1, the robot domain. It is worthy of note that complex operators can be used within
base-level domains, just as in cognitive domains, to introduce useful abstractions. For example, the move
operator could invoke a subtask in which the details of path planning and obstacle avoidance are
considered. This allows higher-level planners to reason about moving as if it were a simple atomic action.
5. A Day in the Life (of an Autonomous Agent)
The power of the MAX architecture derives from the intelligent integration of many relatively simple
capabilities. To illustrate how the aggregate behavior comes about, this section presents an extended
example that exercises many aspects of the system. The example is set within a simple household robot
domain. For the purpose of this example, the sensory and effectory capabilities of the robot will be rather
powerful. The robot has three main effectory capabilities, move, pickup, and putdown. These capabilities
correspond to the operators within the robot domain outlined in the previous section. The robot has one
main sensor that retums a map of the current room. Objects within the room are never obscured, but
objects in other rooms cannot be seen. This provides limitations sufficient to introduce issues due to
incomplete knowledge.
The top-level goal of the robot is to fetch a wrench. However, the tool is in another room, and the robot
does not know its location. Furthermore, the robot has a number of standing goals such as preserving its
own safety and coping with emergencies. The initial knowledge of the robot is limited to the condition of
the room it currently occupies.
The top-level domain of the robot is the select domain. Within this domain, control rules select the solve
operator on the goal of fetching the tool. This choice is made because there are currently no other
unsatisfied goals. The robot enters the problem solving domain wherein the lack of any applicable plan or
procedure causes the plan operator to be fired. This creates a subtask that actually does the planning by
applying the subgoal and apply operators. Unfortunately, since the robot does not know where the wrench
is, the planning task fails, and control returns to the solve task.
Within the solve domain, the failed plan operator asserts the reason for failure, namely that the location
of the wrench is unknown. This causes a rule to fire that attempts to discover the needed knowledge via the
explore operator. The explore operator sets up a new task in which the goal is to discover the location of
the wrench. The exploration task uses the knowledge that doors lead to other rooms to drive its
explorations. As the robot searches, it adds knowledge to its state model and it maintains a separate
structure indicating where it has been. The mental state of the robot at this point in time, as represented by
the current task, is shown in figure 5-1.
To introduce another dimension, assume that as the robot is searching for the wrench, it discovers a fire.
Fires are known to be emergencies; therefore, a rule fires that suspends the explore task, allowing a higher-
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level domain to address the problem. Similarly, the solve task suspends itself since it cannot cope with an
emergency; it is only concerned with solving a particular goal. The select task is returned to, where
emergency heuristics choose to deal with the fire instead of fetch the wrench. This causes the invocation of
a different subtask containing the fire-fighting expertise.
[ (rule search-inferred-location [. • •] )
° ° •
(operator search-location [. • •] }
° ° °
(state [ (current-model [ (at desk rooml)
(at chair rooml)
(at hutch room2) ] )
(locations-searched [(elt rooml) (elt room2) ] ) ] )
(pending solve
[ (rule plan-when-difficult-goal [. • •] )
, ° o
(operator plan [... ])
° o °
(state [ (goal [ (at wrench rooml) ] )
(planning-failure [ (at wrench ?anywhere) ] )
...])
(pending select [...])])]
Figure 5-1: Mental state while exploring
Once the fire is extinguished, the conditions that originally caused the solve task to be applied to fetching
the wrench are still present. Therefore, the robot resumes this activity, which reinvokes the explore task.
Eventually, the desired knowledge is discovered, noticed by matching the exploration goal against the state,
and the exploration task returns its augmented world knowledge. At this point, the robot again attempts to
form a plan to achieve its goal. However, the plan is computed from the current situation, with the robot at
the room in which it discovered the wrench. With the knowledge of the wrench, the plan is built
successfully and asserted within the solve task.
Finally, the presence of the plan that achieves the desired goal causes a new task to be created, that of
executing the plan. The execute task checks each step of the plan against the actual world state. No
discrepancies are found so the plan is executed successfully. This causes the execution and solve tasks to
be completed, and the select task is popped to consider the next goal.
To summarize, the main point of this example is the rational interleaving of planning, execution, and
learning. The robot first attempts to plan. After planning fails, the robot performs some directed physical
actions to obtain more knowledge. While pursuing this task, the robot is interrupted by a more pressing
task. Once the emergency is dealt with, the robot returns to its explorations. With the additional
knowledge found by exploring, the robot successfully builds a plan. Once the plan is completed, it is
executed.
6. Summary
This paper has presented a general architecture that supports explicit reasoning about cognitive
capabilities. The power of the architecture is derived from a knowledge representation that provides a data
structure appropriate to reasoning, and a multi-level control structure that yields reactive knowledge-based
behavior. Both components emphasize modularity and the use of abstractions as a practical requirement
for implementing large systems.
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In addition, a collection of knowledge was described that implements the integration of planning,
execution, and learning. Among the bodies of knowledge are the problem solving domain that intelligently
applies other capabilities, and several intentional leaming paradigms that allow the system to actively seek
knowledge based on need.
A working implementation of the MAX architecture has been completed, and the key elements of the
knowledge used in the example are nearly encoded. In addition, a simple simulator has been written to
update the environment and provide sensory data. The remaining work will focus on completing and
augmenting the capability domains to allow more complex scenarios to be handled.
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